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STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Does a trial court abuse discretion when it denies
appellant's request for continuance if the appellant had a
knowledge of the witness prior to the date of trial?

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court under Section
77-35-26(2)(a) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) and Section
78-2a-3(2)(c) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) whereby a
defendant in a criminal case may take an appeal to the Court
of Appeals from a final judgment of conviction of a class B
misdemeanor rendered in a circuit court.

In this case,

defendant was convicted by a jury before the Honorable
Robert C. Gibson, Fifth Circuit Court, Salt Lake County,
Utah.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY,
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 870286-CA
vs.
MARK MITCHELL aka MILLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment against Mark Mitchell
aka, Miller, for one count of vehicle molestation, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Section 32-3-8, Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake City.

A jury found Mr. Mitchell

guilty of vehicle molestation and not guilty of disturbing
the peace at the end of a one-day trial on May 18, 1987.
Judge Robert C. Gibson sentenced Mr. Mitchell on June
22, 1987.

The defendant was ordered to serve 180 days in

jail, with all but 30 days suspended; pay $500.00 in
attorney's fees; pay $549.00 in restitution; and be on
probation to Adult Probation and Parole for one year.

The

terms of probation are that the defendant complete a
substance abuse counseling program, get a full-time job,
avoid contact with known drug users, and complete forty
hours of community service.

FACTS
The facts, when viewed in a light favorable to
upholding the jury verdict demonstrate:
1.

The defendant, Mark Mitchell aka Mark Miller, was

charged with Vehicle Molestation and Disturbing the Peace,
both class B misdemeanors by information issued December 22,
1986. (R. 59).
2.

Appellant-Mitchell appeared for arraignment and

indicated that his true name was Mark Mitchell.

He was

appointed counsel through the Legal Defenders Association.
His attorney, Lynn Donaldson filed an appearance of counsel
and request for discovery pursuant to Section 77-35-16
U.C.A., on February 4, 1987.

In response to the discovery

request the Salt Lake City Prosecutors office delivered a
formal information and police report to the Legal Defendants
office.

The police report listed the only known witness to

the offense, the victim Mr. Roosevelt Willburn.
3.

(R.R. 1 ) .

No further requests or motions regarding the

discovery were filed by the defense.
was scheduled for March 19, 1987.

A pretrial conference

The City and defense

counsel were present, but the defendant failed to appear.
second pretrial conference was held April 2, 1987.

A

No

resolution was reached and the case was set for trial May
18, 1987.

(Addendum 2 ) .

R.R. refers to the Revised Record pages submitted pursuant
to stipulation of the parties attached as Addendum 1.

4.

On May 18, 1987, the day of the trial, the victim,

Roosevelt Willburn, appeared in the prosecution's office
pursuant to a subpoena.

At that time he also brought Ms.

Leslie Sorrel in to the office.

Upon questioning by the

prosecutor it was determined that Ms. Sorrels was an
eyewitness to the offense charged against the defendant.
(R.R. 2 ) .
5.

Ms. Sorrels further testified that she came into

trial that morning because she had been asked by the victim
Willburn to come and tell what she saw.

(R. 45). However,

she first notified the victim that she had witnessed the
incident approximately one week before May 5, 1987, when she
testified in small claims court.
/

6.

(R. 4 5 ) .

Immediately following discovery of the witness by |

the prosecution and pursuant to the continuing duty to

I

disclose, Prosecutor Cecelia M. Espenoza, telephoned the

[

defendant-Mitchell's counsel and indicated that Ms. Sorrels)
had appeared and would be called as a witness for the
prosecution.
7.
City.

(R.R. 2 ) .

During the trial, two witnesses were called by the
The victim,Mr. Roosevelt Willburn and Ms. Sorrels.

Mr. Willburn identified the defendant as an individual he
had known as Mark Miller.

(R. 22). Mr. Willburn saw the

defendant with a tire iron in his hand immediately after he
heard a knock on the door and looked out the window.
25).

(R.

Mr. Willburn testified that he left his room, saw the

defendant break his windshield and that he was then
threatened by defendant with a knife, which caused him to
return to his room.
8.
/ facts.

(R. 24; 26).

Ms. Sorrels testified to essentially the same
She was also at the Aquarius Motel on the date of

I the incident.

(R. 37). That she knew both parties, Mr.

I Mitchell and Mr. Willburn; she heard a crash, looked out the
I window and saw both men.

(R. 38, 40, 41). She also

observed the victim being chased back into his room by
defendant, Mark Miller (Mitchell).

(R. 41). She believed

i she saw a knife in the defendant's hand (R. 43).
9.

Appellant-Mitchell testified in his own defense.

He asserted that he was not present on the date of the
occurrence.

He presented no alibi witness or evidence.

(R.

54).
10.

At trial May 18, 1987, defendant-Mitchell moved to

/ have Ms. Sorrels testimony excluded based upon State v.
Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987).

(R. 1 ) . The Court denied

I
I that motion and defendant's motion to continue or dismiss
Vjthe case (R.R. 2 ) .
11.

The case was then presented to a jury and

defendant-Mitchell was found guilty of Vehicle Molestation
and not guilty of Disturbing the Peace.

(R. 98).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR
CONTINUANCE.
Trial judges are granted broad discretion in managing
cases and granting continuances.
if there is a clear abuse.

It will be overturned only

The applicable statutory law

provides in pertinent part:
(b) When an act is required or allowed to be
done at or within a specified time, the court
for cause shown may, at any time in its
discretion:
(1) With or without motion or notice, order
the period enlarged if request therefore is
made before the expiration of the period
originally prescribed or as extended by a
previous order; . . . 77-35-2 Utah Code
Ann., 1953 (emphasis added).
In interpreting this standard, the Utah Supreme Court
said:
It is well established in Utah, as elsewhere,
that the granting of a continuance is at the
discretion of the trial judge, whose decision
will not be reversed by this Court absent a
clear abuse of that discretion. State v.
Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982)
citing State v. Moosman, 542 P.2d 1093 (Utah
1975).
Thus, it is clear Utah law that an appellate court will not
substitute its decision for that of the trial judge in the
absence of a demonstration of manifest abuse of discretion.
State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322 (1974).

In the present case, appellant-Mitchell's motion for
continuance was based, at trial upon State v. Knight, 734
P.2d 913 (Utah 1987), which appellant has now abandoned in
his brief.

The reasons for Knight's inapplicability to this

case are addressed in Point II, infra.

However, as

demonstrated below, it is clear that appellant has failed to
establish any law or evidence to support a claim of an abuse
of judicial discretion warranting remand or reversal.
A.

APPELLANT WAS NOT SURPRISED BY WITNESS
LESLIE SORRELS

Appellant-Mitchell alleges that the Court abused its
discretion, in denying his Motion for Continuance, because a
surprise witness was called to his substantial prejudice.
However, the record does not support appellant's claims of
surprise or prejudice.
For example, appellant-Mitchell's own counsel stated:
"we were familiar with her name" and ". . . I did try to
contact Mrs. Sorrels over the weekend [before trial].
just had a real vague address . . ."
added).

I

(R. 1, 2) (Emphasis

From these admissions it is clear that defense

counsel knew of the witness and cannot now claim surprise.
The facts in this case closely resemble State v.
Moraine, 475 P.2d 831 (Utah 1970).

In Moraine, no error was

found in the trial court allowing the state to introduce
inculpatory statements of the defendants.

Similar to the

case at bar, the defendant knew of the statements before

trial; however, the Prosecutor did not know of the testimony
until the "morning of trial,"

Thus, the lower court

admitted the newly discovered witnessf s testimony even
though not disclosed in the Bill of Particulars.

Ld. at

833.
The case now relied upon by appellant-Mitchell,State v.
Gaines, 435 P.2d 68 (Ariz App. 1967), cited in appellant's
Brief, p. 7 is factually distinguishable.

There, the

prosecution dismissed charges against the codefendant and
called him to the stand on the morning of trial.

Thus, the

witness was known to the prosecution, but not the defense.
However, in the case at bar, the witness was known to the
defense but not the prosecution.

The surprise was on the

prosecution who discovered the witness only on the morning
of trial and promptly notified the defense._. X R ^ ? ^ 45).

In

fact, appellant-Mitchell's knowledge of the witness came
from her testimony at a small claims hearing held
approximately two weeks before trial (R. 45). The Gaines
case is totally in apposite to the case here at issue.
In order for the appellant to prevail, he must show
that the basis of the continuance is to produce "material
and admissible testimony" subsequent to exercising "due
diligence."

State v. Creviston, supra, at 752, Accord:

State v. Freshwater, 30 Utah 442, 85 P. 447 (1906).
However, since appellant-Mitchell knew of the witness, his
pretrial remedy and responsibility was to bring a motion to

continue pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-3516(g), which provides:
(g) If at any time during the course of the
proceedings it is brought to the attention of
the court that a party has failed to comply
with this rule, the court may order such
party to permit the discovery or inspection,
grant a continuance, or prohibit the party
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or
it may enter such other order as it deems
just under the circumstances. (Emphasis
added).
In this case, appellant-Mitchell made a choice not to
request an order from the court in advance of trial because
he knew Ms. Sorrels testimony was inculpatory; further,
2
appellant knew via the police report that the City was
unaware of Ms. Sorrels. When the prosecution did become
knowledgeable and informed appellant's counsel, he was not
surprised by the testimony or prejudiced in his defense; in
point-of-fact, appellant-Mitchell only objects to truthful
testimony he hoped would not come forward.

(Respondent's

Statement of Facts Nos. 4-8).
There is no abuse of discretion when a Court denies a
motion to suppress made by a party who "knew or could have
discovered the evidence prior to trial"; also, there is no
error to admit "newly discovered evidence" which was
actually within the defendant's knowledge.

State v. Sparks,

672 P.2d 92 (Utah, 1983); State v. Moraine, supra at 833.

See, appellant-Mitchell's Addendum "B" to his Brief.

B.

APPELLANT'S ALLEGED IMPEACHMENT OF MS.
SORRELS WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED; THUS,
APPELLANT-MITCHELL HAS FAILED TO SHOW AN
ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION OR
PREJUDICE.

Appellant claims prejudice because the testimony given
by Ms. Sorrels corroborated the testimony of the victim and
3
contradicted appellant's defense,
even present at the crime scene.

which was that he as not
The long established rule

is that "all persons other than those excepted by statute
may be witnesses."
(1910).

State v. Greene, 38 Utah 389, 115 P. 181

Further, impeachment on the basis of past crimes

is seriously limited to avoid unfair harassment of witnesses
and wrongly prejudice truthful and relevant evidence by an
appeal to bias and prejudice.

Utah law would have precluded

appellant-Mitchell's naked attempt to impeach Ms. Sorrels on
such grounds. Utah law provides:
It is the right of a witness to be protected
from irrelevant, improper or insulting
questions, and from harsh or insulting
demeanor, to be detained only so long as the
interests of justice require it, and to be
examined only as to matters legal and
pertinent to the issue. 78-24-11 Utah Code
Ann., 1953. (Emphasis added).
A prior version of this statute interpreted by the Utah
Supreme Court as early as 1898:
[W]as intended to allow impeachment of a
witness by introduction of character evidence
only so far as the witnessf general character
is in issue in the case. State v. Marks, 16
Utah 204, 51 P. 1089 (Utah 1898).
Appellant-Mitchell's Brief, p. 8.

Ms. Sorrels' character was not an issue in this case.
In the present case appellant's allegation of error
centers on the FBI rap sheet which was obtained subsequent
to trial.

Appellant claims that the rap sheet shows areas

where Ms. Sorrels credibility could be impeached.
Respondent submits that had Ms. Sorrels been known to
appellant as a witness counsel would request a state rap
sheet from respondent.

That rap sheet (Respondent's

Addendum 3) would not show any convictions which could be
used against the witness.
Even taking the FBI rap sheet, it the light most
favorable to appellant's claims, it fails to reveal
convictions which could be used to impeach the witness.
The charges noted in the FBI rap sheet must meet the
standards of Utah Rules of Evidence Section 609 to have been
used against Ms. Sorrels.

Here convictions, occurring "more

than 10 years prior" are statutorily barred 609(b) Utah
Rules of Evidence.
Appellant-Mitchell argues that Ms. Sorrels has
"arrests" for crimes which fall within the 609(a)(2)
impeachment standards.

However, Section 609 requires a

conviction.
Further, there must be a finding by the Court that the
probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect.

Regarding this point our Supreme Court

recently excluded felony convictions and reversed a lower

court admission of prior felony conviction for impeachment.
It noted that Rule 609(a) permits "convictions" not
involving honesty or false statements to be used for
impeachment, but:
. . • only if the court determines that
the probative value of admitting the
evidence out weighs its prejudicial
effect. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325,
1334 (Utah 1986) (Emphasis in original
and citations omitted).
The case of State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1352 (Utah
1977), cited at appellant-Mitchell's Brief at p. 9, is not
to the contrary.

Rather, the case stands for the position

that appellant must demonstrate a "reasonable probability"
that the defendant would have not been convicted.

Having

failed to demonstrate clear abuse, appellant has failed to
meet that test.

As with Banner the information is

excludable and prejudicial, as a matter of law.
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that since she
could not have been impeached based upon the "rap" sheet,
appellant-Mitchell was not prejudiced by the Court's denial
of his Motion to Continue, and there was no abuse of
discretion.

The conviction should be affirmed.
POINT II

APPELLANT-MITCHELL WAS NOT DENIED DUE
PROCESS BY THE PROSECUTION'S VOLUNTARY
DISCLOSURE OF AN INCULPATORY WITNESS, AT
THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
Appellant-Mitchell's motions at trial were
alternatively, a Motion to Exclude Ms. Sorrel's testimony or

a Motion to Continue (R. 1, 2 ) . Although both motions were
properly denied by the City admits as general principle of
law that error may attach if the prosecution willfully
withholds information.
The law on the subject of when the withholding of
evidence by the prosecution denies a defendant due process
of law has been set down by the United States Supreme Court
in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
In Brady the U.S. Supreme Court established the basic
principle that suppression of requested and favorable
material evidence by the prosecution, violates due process.
However, it is clear that the information must be
within the knowledge of the prosecution and must be
requested; voluntary disclosure of inculpatory evidence
the prosecution is not required.

State v. Workman,(635 P.2d

[9 (Utah 1981).) In Workman, the Utah Supreme Court rejected
the defendant which would have required the
prosecution to voluntarily disclose inculpatory evidence.
The Court cited Moore v. Illinois, to establish when due
process requires suppression:
The heart of the holding in Brady is the
prosecution1s suppression of evidence, in the
face of a defense production request, where
the evidence is favorable to the accused and
is material either to guilty or to
punishment. Important then, are (a)
suppression by the prosecution after a
request by the defense, (b) the evidence's
favorable character for the defense, and (c)
the materiality of the evidence. These are
the standards by which the prosecutions?

conduct in Moore's case is to be measured.
State v. Workman, Id. at p. 52 citing Moore
v. 111., 408 U.S. 786 (1972) reh. den. 409
U.S. 897 (1972) (Emphasis added).
Appellant-Mitchell has failed to establish any of these
elements.

Appellant^made no request for the information.

<y

He knew of the witness existence and had received the police
report; thus, he knew that the witness was not listed.

He

did not request information about her whereabouts for
reasons discussed in Point I A supra.

There was no

surprise, except the late discovery by the prosecution of
what appellant-Mitchell already knew.
Further, the evidence^in question was inculpatory
testimony of a collateral witness; thus, it was not
favorable to the defense.
Lastly, the third prong of the test "materiality" is
defined in State v. Shaffer; here, our Court observed:
[C]onstitutional materiality requires that
there be a showing that the suppressed or
destroyed evidence is vital to the issues of
whether defendant is guilty of the charge and
whether there is a fundamental unfairness
that requires the Court to set aside the
defendant' s conviction." State v. Shaffer,
725 P.2d 1301, 1305 (Utah 1986).
Inculpatory information, such as an additional witness, will
not meet this standard of "materiality."
In the present case, the prosecution provided all it
knew and more information than was statutorily required.
Therefore, even if defense counsel had not received a
telephone call from the prosecution on the morning of trial,
the Court could have allowed Ms. Sorrels to testify.

For a case closely in point see State v. Adams, 583
P.2d 89 (Utah 1978).

Here the defendant was not informed of

an admission made to a police officer, but on appeal the
Court found no reversible error and correctly observed:
In regard to defendant's final point: That
prejudicial error was committed because the
prosecution did not disclose to him that it
intended to use the testimony of Officer Reit
concerning defendant's admission, this is to
be said: We are in agreement with the
proposition that the prosecution is under an
obligation to treat the defendant fairly; and
that it cannot willfully suppress evidence
favorable to him for the purpose of obtaining
a conviction. However, as will be seen from
what has been said above, there was no abuse
of that principle. The defendant and his
counsel were aware of what had happened; and
there was no suppression of evidence
involved. State v. Adams, Id. at 91; accord:
State v. Jarrell, Utah 608 P.2d 218 (1980);
see also State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah
1985), where the evidence challenged by the
defendant was corroborative of the State's
case.
As in the Carter case, Ms. Sorrels was not the only
witness to appellant-Mitchell's conduct.

Victim-Willburn,

also, identified the appellant as the person he saw
4
threatening him with a knife.
The case law is clear that
the prosecution has been relieved of the obligation to
provide even exculpatory information, if the record does not
show that "thef prosecution knew or should have known" about
the information.

See also, State v. Fierst, 692 P.2d 751

(Utah 1981).
See respondent's Statement of Fact 7.

Unlike State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) cited
by appellant-Mitchell, this is not a case where defendant
made a motion to compel.

However, even if a motion had been

made, the prosecution did not know of the witness until just
before trial.

(See Statement of Fact Nos. 4, 5). Even if

the appellant requested and received an order from the Court
to disclose inculpatory information, if it is contrary to
the prosecution's rights, the prosecution could have refused
to honor the order and still submitted the evidence.
Where the court orders the prosecuting
attorney in a bill of particulars to give
matters not required by the statute, the
court may excuse the failure to furnish such
material by permitting the evidence to be
introduced, as was done in this case.
Besides, if anyone knew about the statement,
it surely was the defendant himself. State
v. Moraine, infra at 833. (Emphasis added).
Here, the prosecution did not know of the witness until
the morning of trial, the witness was inculpatory and
*

•

—

—

"""

~ j ^ ~

appellant knew about her prior to the time of trial.
Therefore, the Court properly denied appellant-Mitchell's
motions.
CONCLUSION
The decision to grant or deny a request for a
continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial
court.

Where the appellant knows of a witness, he cannot

claim prejudice based upon surprise.
5
See respondent's Statement of Fact, Nos. 4-6.

The testimony of witness Sorrels was admissible and not
subject to impeachment, based on the evidence presented
after the trial.
Finally, the prosecution was not required to provide
inculpatory evidence to the appellant.

The prosecution's

voluntary disclosure, as soon as practical, was evidence of
the good faith of the prosecution.

Appellant suffered no

denial of due process and therefore, the conviction should
stand.
Respectfully submitted this ,9
<£LcLL

day of

, 1988.

?

^u^u^

CECELIA M. ESPENQ2A

ADDENDUM 1

AUUJLNUUM 1

SALT LAKE CITY VS. MARK MILLER
The Court is in session:

Judge:

Salt Lake City vs. Michael Cook.
Salt Lake City v. Mark Miller.

Ms.E:

Cecelia Espenoza on behalf of the City, Your Honor.

Mr.D:

Lynn Donaldson on behalf of Mark Miller.

Judge:

You ready to proceed?

Ms.E:

I believe so Your Honor.

Judge:

You ready to proceed, Mr. Donaldson?

Mr.D:

Yes, Your Honor

Judge:

Have the jury, we'll have the jury brought in.

Mark is here.

(Inaudible comments of Mr. Donaldson and Ms. Expenoza).

Have you

heard from Mr* Stevens on this other case?
Ms.E:

No, your honor I haven't.

Mr.D:

There is one issue maybe we should deal with before the

jury come, your Honor.

Apparently, the prosecution just had a

witness come in this morning that we were familiar with her name,
we had never known they were going to call her as a witness.

And

we didn't have her address or weren't able to run a rap sheet on
her.

Her name is Leslie Sorrell, we ask that she be excluded

based on State vs. Knight.
Ms.E:

Your Honor, the City would submit pursuant to State vs.

Knight, that our obligation is simply to inform the Defense as
soon as we know of any witnesses, of their presence and of the
fact that we would be intending to call them.

As soon as I found

out she came in this morning, and may have positive testimony as
to this case, I did call Mr. Donaldson at his office this morning
and informed him of that.

He said he did not have any prior

knowledge of this witness, we did not have her name listed on the
police report nor did we have an address or phone for her prior
to this time.

I believe the City had met our burden under State

vs. Knight by contacting the defense counsel as soon as we knew
of that information.

We do believe the testimony she would give

on this case would be relevant and we do request that she be
allowed to testify.
Judge:

Do you have any belief or reason to believe that the

City has intentionally or negligently failed to advise you of
this witness?
Mr.D:

No, Your Honor.

I guess the only thing that we could

do then would be to ask for a continuance.

I know this case has

sort of drug out but, I did try to contact Mrs. Sorrels over the
weekend.

I just had a real vague address - State Street, 48th

South, I went knocking on houses and the whole bit.

Wasn't able

to fine her.
Judge:

Motion to dismiss or motion to exclude the witness from

testifying in the case or a motion to continue, all of those
motions are denied under the circumstances, we will proceed.
Clerk:

What was the witness's first name?

Ms.E:

Leslie.

Clerk:

Inaudible

Judge:

It doesn't appear we have the necessary number of

jurors.

Some of them have been straggling in.

I'm probably

going to have to set my jury calls for a little bit earlier to
make sure they get here.

I hate to inconvenience the jurors that

way but if they're not going to get here, I'm going to have to do
it.

The Court will recess now.
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iolation Date: 12/20/86
1. MOLEST VEHICLE
Plea: Not Guilty
2. DISTURBING THE PEACE
Plea: Not Guilty

Bail
32-3-8
100.00
Finding/Judgment: Guilty - Jury
62.50
32-1-11
Finding/Judgment: Not Guilty - Jury

:eedings
!3/86 Case filed on 12/23/86.
LKC
Began tracking
Review on 03/23/87 LKC
•2/87 GIBSON/CKO T209 DPWOC DPNG TRIAL 2-9-87 9:30 A.M.
CKO
TRL
scheduled for 2/ 9/87 at 9:30 A in room ? with RCG
JJW
Ended tracking of Prosecutor's Stay
JJW
3/87 GIBSON/CKO T210 DPWOC C/O REFER TO LDA (ATTY FEES)
CKO
4/87 FILED APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL LDA L DONALDSON
JLC
FILED REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
JLC
9/87 GIBSON/CKO/KEESLER T283 C223 DPW LYNN DONALDSON LDA TO FTLE
CKO
JURY DEMAND C/O PRE TRIAL CONFERENCE TO BE SET
CKO
3/87 JURY DEMAND FILED ON 2-10-87 - LDA.
EEM
3/87 FILED SUBPOENA
AOK
D/87 GIBSON/CKO C/O PRE TRIAL CONFERENCE 3-19-87 9:30 A.M. (LYNN
CKO
DONALDSON & CITY NOTIFIED)
CKO
PTC
scheduled for 3/19/87 at 9:30 A in room ? with RCG
CKO
)/87 GIBSON/CKO/GEORGE T588 C1580 DNP CHERYL JOLLEY FOR LYNN
CKO
DONALDSON. C/O BW BAIL $505
CKO
•/87 Warrant ordered
AOK
Bench Warrant printed
AOK
/87 Warrant order updated
AOK
BENCH WARRANT issued - JUDGE RCG
AOK
Failure to comply with court order
AOK
Bail amount ordered:
505.00
AOK
/87 GBISON/CKO T631 C2728 DPW LYNN DONALDSON C/O RECALL BW
CKO
C/O PRE TRIAL CONFERENCE RESET FOR 4-2-87 9:00 A.M.
CKO
CITY NOTIFIED
CKO
PTC
scheduled for 4/ 2/87 at 9:00 A in room ? with RCG
CKO
Warrant recalled on 03/27/87 because of Court Order
CKO
'87 GIBSON/CKO/ESPENOZA T695 C13 07 DPW LYNN DONALDSON. DEFT ADVISED. CKO
C/O JURY TRIAL 5-18-87 9:00 A.M.
CKO
TRJ
scheduled for 5/18/87 at 9:00 A in room ? with RCG
CKO
'87 FILED SUBPOENA ON RETURN
JJW
'87 GIBSON/CKO/ESPENOZA T1044 C545 T1061 C0001 T1062 C0001 DPW
CKO
LYNN DONALDSON. A JURY OF 4 PERSONS, NAMELY 1-RUTH ANN PUTNAM,
CKO
2-J HAROLD JONES 3-MAE JEANNINE OHRN AND 4-HEIDI RIGBY BECK
CKO
WERE SWORN AND IMPANELED. DEFTS MOTION C/O WITNESSES EXCLUDED.
CKO
CITY WITNESSES LESLIE SORRELS AND ROOSEVELT WILBURN WERE SWORN
CKO
AND TESTIFIED. DEFTS TRUE NAME MARK ANTHONY MITCHELL. CITY RESTS CKO
DEFT AND ROZALIND DIANE SMITH WERE SWORN AND TESTIFIED ON
CKO
DEFTS BEHALF. D-l-LIST OF MOTEL RESIDENTS MARKED BUT NOT
CKO
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JAIL $500 ATTY FEES $549.23 RESTITUTION TO BE PAID TO THE
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AFTER SERVING 3 0 DAYS JAIL CONDITIONS 1-40 HOURS COMMUNITY
SERVICE THRU JAIL ALTERNATIVE 2-RULES OF AP&P
3-VOCATIONAL & SUBSTANCE COUNSELING 4-7ULLTIME EMPLOYMENT
5-DO NOT ASSOCIATE WITH PERSON USING NON PRESCRIBED DRUGS
ATTY FEES & RESTITUTION STAY 12-22-87 PROBATION 7-22-88
./87 CREATE Trust A/R # 01 Restitution
549.23
CREATE Trust A/R # 02 Attorney Fee - City
500.00
Began tracking Fine Stay
Review on 12/22/87
Began tracking Probation
Review on 07/22/88
)/J}7 FILED NOTICE OF APPEAL
FILED DESIGNATION OF RECORD ON APPEAL
FILED NOTICE REGARDING TRANSCRIPT
1/87 TRANSFERRED CERTIFIED COPY OF NOTICE OF APPEAL, NOTICE REGARDING
TRANSCRIPT, .AND DESIGNATION OF RECORD ON APPEAL TO COURT OF
APPEALS.
anting Summary
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\/R Type:
Restitution
attorney Fee
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# 02

162.50
Total Due
549.23
500.00
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bional Case Data
Fine Summary
Fine:
$1049.23
Jail: 180
Parties
Payee
CARTOW
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SLC

Suspended:
Suspended:

150

#01
UT

Work Phone: (

Payee
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SALT LAKE CITY TREASURER
Personal Description
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DOB:
Dr. Lie. No.:
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)
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TRACKING STATUS
Fine Stay
Probation

Review Date
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End of the docket report for this case.
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